The tools are not the bad things. They are just tools.
Our problem is that when we obtained a new tool like the BFT's, commanders were misusing the tools. Partially because it was sooooo new they were never truly prepared for how to use them or their repercussions.
Example:
In the Napoleonic age, Napoleon HAD to trust Murat would make the correct choices when outside his sphere of direct command. In WWII Montgomery HAD to trust Urquhart was holding the bridge. Montgomery simply lacked the means to direct the battlefield from afar. The United States HAD to trust that the Commanding Officer of the USS Argus would do what was necessary in Tripoli.
Today, members of congress in a meeting room or the president himself can direct individual unit commanders with real time intel more detailed than the commander himself has access to. No one was prepared for this.
So when someone loses someone in combat, the after action review, will ask of the higher unit commander, "What more could you have done to prevent this from happening", "Was it within your means to prevent?", and if so, "why do we trust you with command after you failed to act". Of course today, the answer is YES he could have done something, but we don't ask the question, "SHOULD he have done something?" Should a commander babysit his subordinates? The answer is no. The proper defensible response, should be, "The unit commander was entrusted to make the call without my oversight, so I trusted him make that call."
Therein perhaps lies a very bitter rind to eat in the Afghanistan debacle. If we had been successful, no one would perform an autopsy that is so desperately required.