An experienced Blackhawk pilot shares critical insights into the recent Reagan Airport crash, highlighting systemic failures and the absence of essential safety protocols. Read on for an in-depth analysis of this tragic incident.
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By Wayne Allyn Root
My longtime friend is a retired Colonel in the U.S. Army who served in the roles of both Blackhawk helicopter pilot, and Blackhawk Crew Chief as well. No one knows this helicopter better than my friend. Let’s call him Colonel Joe.
We’ve all seen the reports about the mistakes made in this tragic crash. We know the chopper was flying too high. We know the Control Tower was short of air controllers- and one controller was doing the job of two. It appears the Blackhawk was off course as well.
And we all suspect DEI could have been at fault- whether this involved the pilots, flight commanders on the ground, or the Air Controllers.
But my friend Colonel Joe is the expert. Here is Colonel Joe’s “Executive Summary.” These are his words- coming from a lifelong experienced Blackhawk pilot and Crew Chief.
In his opinion, the biggest issue is the flight was missing a fourth crew member for a night flight- a second Crew Chief.
Colonel Joe’s Executive Summary:
*The single-greatest error in this accident was the decision to fly without a second Crew Chief on the left-hand side of the Blackhawk, who could have provided an extra set of eyes to “look out-and-up” to see the approaching American Airlines Passenger plane.
*Night Vision Goggle (NVG) flights result in a sort-of “tunnel vision” for all who wear the NVGs and normal policy in many Army flight units is to force a full crew of 2 pilots and 2 crew chiefs for all NVG flights, so that you always have “eyes out” to both sides of the aircraft, when flying in those conditions. While not mandatory, it is the proper safety call, especially when flying in the vicinity of a busy, major airport such as Reagan Airport (DCA). No matter how competent the pilots and Crew Chiefs may be, this flight needed a second Crew Chief on the left side of the chopper.
*The front-left pilot, even if not wearing Night Vision Goggles, would still have limited visibility out the left door, and if that pilot is busy with radio calls, or referencing the map/GPS, that pilot could get consumed by work inside the cockpit, instead of looking out and around.
*Flight Unit Leadership failed to recognize the need for a second Crew Chief in the Mission Planning and Risk Assessment Process. This is where either incompetence, or DEI (or both), may have come into play. This was certainly poor leadership.
*Known mistakes by the Blackhawk Flight Crew point to a lack of experience and/or competence. We’ve heard in the media that both pilots were “experienced.” This is just not true. Someone is “blowing smoke” to the media, to President Trump, and to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, to “cover their ass.” The collective level of experience of the pilots was not impressive. Their level of experience is like comparing a rookie in the NFL to a second-year player. The pilot had the experience of a second-year player, while the co-pilot was a rookie. This was NOT an experienced crew to be flying at night, near a major airport, without a second crew chief.
*Radio calls were not responded to by the Blackhawk crew, and they flew at 350 Feet above ground level (AGL), whereas reports say they were supposed to fly at 200 Feet AGL. These two mistakes alone show that the crew were not as experienced or professional as reported to President Trump, Defense Secretary Hegseth, or the media.
*The Instructor Pilot may have been too inexperienced for this “Annual Evaluation” flight, as mistakes were clearly made during the course of the flight (that are assumed to have been made by the junior pilot being evaluated). Why didn’t the Instructor Pilot notice they were flying too high and off course? That points to his lack of experience. If there had been a second Crew Chief, he could have noticed these mistakes and warned the pilots.
*The Flight Unit Commanders must share the blame, and they’re still alive! There is a 12th Aviation Battalion commander of that B Company, and I don’t know who that is, but this individual was the first leader in the chain of events for the Mission Plan and Risk Assessment to get signed off and approved. This B Company commander should be asked why they did not enforce a second Crew Chief to be on that flight.
*Accident sequences for these types of accidents begin in “Mission Planning,” when first selecting the time you will fly, where you will fly for the Annual Evaluation, and what crew members will be on the flight. Any of the Leaders in that unit’s Chain of Command could have demanded that this flight have two Crew Chiefs aboard the aircraft, due to NVG flying conditions, plus the busy airspace of Reagan airport.
*An experienced, thoughtful leader knows when to “raise the standard” and force the mission to have that second Crew Chief aboard the aircraft. This was clearly one of those moments, and both the B Company Commander and the 12th Aviation Battalion Commander failed to see through this risk problem and impose their own “Risk Reduction” to include a second Crew Chief to manage the left-hand side of the Blackhawk.
*In my opinion, even with all these mistakes that were made, a Crew Chief on the left side of the Blackhawk would still have saved them in that last 20 seconds when that American Airlines flight was approaching on the left-hand side. A Crew Chief in that seat would have warned the pilots to turn and descend immediately.
This accident was completely avoidable. Thank you to my friend Colonel Joe for this thoughtful analysis.
