Baddest military action - based target/sniper rifle

The bottom line for me is who the fuck, specifically, is standing in the way of progress?
We rarely put people who are passionate and invested in specific skill sets and systems expertise into long-term jobs where that’s all they cover-down on. Instead, officers and senior NCOs will spend maybe 2 years with a program, then move on to something entirely different.

A lot of the program officers just came from a staff position that is unrelated. Before that, they did a command or Company-level XO slot. All of a sudden, they get orders to go work at one of the many fragmented centers for weapons development or proponency, whether it be Natick Army Soldier Systems Center, ARDEC, Picatinny Arsenal, Fort Benning, or the Pentagon.

Instead of finding a dedicated gun guy who has Scout Sniper Platoon experience for a sniper system as an example, it will often be some random officer whose branch manager put him into the system looking for the next ever-changing formula for what’s best for his career path.

He shows up to the new assignment, which has usually had several years of RDT&E on it already, and the outgoing OIC will brief him on what they’ve been doing, why, and what the current program schedule is. His duties and responsibilities related to budget, signature authority over inventory and personnel, and other administrative issues will be laid out, and the ball will be handed to him.

He will spend the next 6-12 months just trying to get a handle on the program while the subordinates continue on with what they were doing. There is often travel to industry conferences like AUSA, SOFEX, and SHOT Show where they will meet with vendors looking to find existing capabilities that can be tweaked to meet the program requirements.

Testing and soldier feedback studies will be conducted and documented following extensive protocols that generations of prior program managers from other commands have outlined and added upon. A primary driving force for the OIC will be to get his Officer Evaluation Report bullets rated favorably by his rater, who is overseeing multiple programs with other systems and subordinate officers managing their respective projects. 18-23 months flies by fast, terminal leave comes along with all kinds of use/lose days he’s accumulated chasing paper, and then he’s gone.

One of the things I’ve seen from these types of officers is that in place of comprehensive understanding of a system or concept, they will latch onto one aspect of the program that stood out to them when they tried to wrap their head around it. Given a total lack of relevant background, whatever they latch onto will be a distraction and deviant focal point from the core program intent. This often rises from problems that have been identified by the prior testing, in an area that needs to be fixed or improved because of an arbitrary or marginal need, but not really a game-changer. That’s how you end up with M-14s after WWII, forward assist on the M16A1 (1967), elevation wheels on M16A2 rear sights with heavy fore end barrel profiles and 3-round burst (1982), alternate magazine feed capability for the SAW, top handguards for the M240, and modular handguns.

In contrast, “the DoD entity” takes highly-experienced NCOs, Warrant Officers, and officers with extensive technical and operational backgrounds in skill sets they love and are good at, gives them pretty wide left and right limits with a generous budget, and tells them to take the ball and run as fast and far as they can with it to provide actual practical solutions for their organization. Often times, they are chasing capabilities they recognized and outlined themselves from doing the job personally for the past 10-18 years.

That’s how you get sections of Weaver rail bolted onto free-float handguards, which evolved into KAC rails and the MRE, Schmidt & Bender Short Dot LPVOs that changed the game for magnified optics on carbines, .260 Rem SR-25s, and now 6mm ARC DM rifles.

Meanwhile big Army thinks a steel upper receiver Hk 7.62 NATO rifle is a DMR, while working on a .270 Weatherby Magnum performance wunderwaffen, and Joe is still humping a 17lb SAW in 5.56 NATO that uses a Kalashnikov operating system. But we have SIG 9mm handguns that don’t make a hill of beans difference in the big picture compared to the M9. Success!

It all comes down to being terrible at identifying and managing talent. There is this odd fixation with moving people around to get as many different assignments as possible, rather than making them really good in a few areas of expertise.
 
I agree 10000%

The same issues occur in the civilian world as well.

It is almost impossible to find any level of management that understands the 10,000 foot view

They all come in with resumes which they earned and are more than smart enough.

Their knowledge base expands but the implementation of the knowledge on a broad spectrum is difficult for them.

You can have all the protocols and meetings in the world but someone has to sit down and follow “the story the project is trying to tell”

And if you can find one that gets it you can be sure they start their own company with in 10 years because they understand that no one else gets it either

I always joke that I’m not a business owner, I have the worlds largest kindergarten class.
 
We rarely put people who are passionate and invested in specific skill sets and systems expertise into long-term jobs where that’s all they cover-down on. Instead, officers and senior NCOs will spend maybe 2 years with a program, then move on to something entirely different.

A lot of the program officers just came from a staff position that is unrelated. Before that, they did a command or Company-level XO slot. All of a sudden, they get orders to go work at one of the many fragmented centers for weapons development or proponency, whether it be Natick Army Soldier Systems Center, ARDEC, Picatinny Arsenal, Fort Benning, or the Pentagon.

Instead of finding a dedicated gun guy who has Scout Sniper Platoon experience for a sniper system as an example, it will often be some random officer whose branch manager put him into the system looking for the next ever-changing formula for what’s best for his career path.

He shows up to the new assignment, which has usually had several years of RDT&E on it already, and the outgoing OIC will brief him on what they’ve been doing, why, and what the current program schedule is. His duties and responsibilities related to budget, signature authority over inventory and personnel, and other administrative issues will be laid out, and the ball will be handed to him.

He will spend the next 6-12 months just trying to get a handle on the program while the subordinates continue on with what they were doing. There is often travel to industry conferences like AUSA, SOFEX, and SHOT Show where they will meet with vendors looking to find existing capabilities that can be tweaked to meet the program requirements.

Testing and soldier feedback studies will be conducted and documented following extensive protocols that generations of prior program managers from other commands have outlined and added upon. A primary driving force for the OIC will be to get his Officer Evaluation Report bullets rated favorably by his rater, who is overseeing multiple programs with other systems and subordinate officers managing their respective projects. 18-23 months flies by fast, terminal leave comes along with all kinds of use/lose days he’s accumulated chasing paper, and then he’s gone.

One of the things I’ve seen from these types of officers is that in place of comprehensive understanding of a system or concept, they will latch onto one aspect of the program that stood out to them when they tried to wrap their head around it. Given a total lack of relevant background, whatever they latch onto will be a distraction and deviant focal point from the core program intent. This often rises from problems that have been identified by the prior testing, in an area that needs to be fixed or improved because of an arbitrary or marginal need, but not really a game-changer. That’s how you end up with M-14s after WWII, forward assist on the M16A1 (1967), elevation wheels on M16A2 rear sights with heavy fore end barrel profiles and 3-round burst (1982), alternate magazine feed capability for the SAW, top handguards for the M240, and modular handguns.

In contrast, “the DoD entity” takes highly-experienced NCOs, Warrant Officers, and officers with extensive technical and operational backgrounds in skill sets they love and are good at, gives them pretty wide left and right limits with a generous budget, and tells them to take the ball and run as fast and far as they can with it to provide actual practical solutions for their organization. Often times, they are chasing capabilities they recognized and outlined themselves from doing the job personally for the past 10-18 years.

That’s how you get sections of Weaver rail bolted onto free-float handguards, which evolved into KAC rails and the MRE, Schmidt & Bender Short Dot LPVOs that changed the game for magnified optics on carbines, .260 Rem SR-25s, and now 6mm ARC DM rifles.

Meanwhile big Army thinks a steel upper receiver Hk 7.62 NATO rifle is a DMR, while working on a .270 Weatherby Magnum performance wunderwaffen, and Joe is still humping a 17lb SAW in 5.56 NATO that uses a Kalashnikov operating system. But we have SIG 9mm handguns that don’t make a hill of beans difference in the big picture compared to the M9. Success!

It all comes down to being terrible at identifying and managing talent. There is this odd fixation with moving people around to get as many different assignments as possible, rather than making them really good in a few areas of expertise.
We always had that issue and then we grew that issue with removing a lot of specialty skills so that "everyone will be capable". As a result we lost the subject matter experts in specific systems and went to subject matter mediocrity. Just my .02

The hard part is getting the objective look versus the subjective look while blocking out their own personal bias because they have one or they shot a friends and it worked good on the range.
 
We rarely put people who are passionate and invested in specific skill sets and systems expertise into long-term jobs where that’s all they cover-down on. Instead, officers and senior NCOs will spend maybe 2 years with a program, then move on to something entirely different.

A lot of the program officers just came from a staff position that is unrelated. Before that, they did a command or Company-level XO slot. All of a sudden, they get orders to go work at one of the many fragmented centers for weapons development or proponency, whether it be Natick Army Soldier Systems Center, ARDEC, Picatinny Arsenal, Fort Benning, or the Pentagon.

Instead of finding a dedicated gun guy who has Scout Sniper Platoon experience for a sniper system as an example, it will often be some random officer whose branch manager put him into the system looking for the next ever-changing formula for what’s best for his career path.

He shows up to the new assignment, which has usually had several years of RDT&E on it already, and the outgoing OIC will brief him on what they’ve been doing, why, and what the current program schedule is. His duties and responsibilities related to budget, signature authority over inventory and personnel, and other administrative issues will be laid out, and the ball will be handed to him.

He will spend the next 6-12 months just trying to get a handle on the program while the subordinates continue on with what they were doing. There is often travel to industry conferences like AUSA, SOFEX, and SHOT Show where they will meet with vendors looking to find existing capabilities that can be tweaked to meet the program requirements.

Testing and soldier feedback studies will be conducted and documented following extensive protocols that generations of prior program managers from other commands have outlined and added upon. A primary driving force for the OIC will be to get his Officer Evaluation Report bullets rated favorably by his rater, who is overseeing multiple programs with other systems and subordinate officers managing their respective projects. 18-23 months flies by fast, terminal leave comes along with all kinds of use/lose days he’s accumulated chasing paper, and then he’s gone.

One of the things I’ve seen from these types of officers is that in place of comprehensive understanding of a system or concept, they will latch onto one aspect of the program that stood out to them when they tried to wrap their head around it. Given a total lack of relevant background, whatever they latch onto will be a distraction and deviant focal point from the core program intent. This often rises from problems that have been identified by the prior testing, in an area that needs to be fixed or improved because of an arbitrary or marginal need, but not really a game-changer. That’s how you end up with M-14s after WWII, forward assist on the M16A1 (1967), elevation wheels on M16A2 rear sights with heavy fore end barrel profiles and 3-round burst (1982), alternate magazine feed capability for the SAW, top handguards for the M240, and modular handguns.

In contrast, “the DoD entity” takes highly-experienced NCOs, Warrant Officers, and officers with extensive technical and operational backgrounds in skill sets they love and are good at, gives them pretty wide left and right limits with a generous budget, and tells them to take the ball and run as fast and far as they can with it to provide actual practical solutions for their organization. Often times, they are chasing capabilities they recognized and outlined themselves from doing the job personally for the past 10-18 years.

That’s how you get sections of Weaver rail bolted onto free-float handguards, which evolved into KAC rails and the MRE, Schmidt & Bender Short Dot LPVOs that changed the game for magnified optics on carbines, .260 Rem SR-25s, and now 6mm ARC DM rifles.

Meanwhile big Army thinks a steel upper receiver Hk 7.62 NATO rifle is a DMR, while working on a .270 Weatherby Magnum performance wunderwaffen, and Joe is still humping a 17lb SAW in 5.56 NATO that uses a Kalashnikov operating system. But we have SIG 9mm handguns that don’t make a hill of beans difference in the big picture compared to the M9. Success!

It all comes down to being terrible at identifying and managing talent. There is this odd fixation with moving people around to get as many different assignments as possible, rather than making them really good in a few areas of expertise.
Blame Robert McNamara. He was the former logistics officer who introduced the Ford Motor Company system that effectively eliminated the competent, experienced, specialist military officer throughout the DOD.
That particular initiative has probably killed far more US soldiers, sailors and airforce types than his decision to send undeveloped Armalite rifles to the troops in Vietnam; without instruction manuals, cleaning kits and the appropriate Ordnance personnel who would normally have been detached to assist with field trials of brand new weapons and ammunition.
 
We rarely put people who are passionate and invested in specific skill sets and systems expertise into long-term jobs where that’s all they cover-down on. Instead, officers and senior NCOs will spend maybe 2 years with a program, then move on to something entirely different.

A lot of the program officers just came from a staff position that is unrelated. Before that, they did a command or Company-level XO slot. All of a sudden, they get orders to go work at one of the many fragmented centers for weapons development or proponency, whether it be Natick Army Soldier Systems Center, ARDEC, Picatinny Arsenal, Fort Benning, or the Pentagon.

Instead of finding a dedicated gun guy who has Scout Sniper Platoon experience for a sniper system as an example, it will often be some random officer whose branch manager put him into the system looking for the next ever-changing formula for what’s best for his career path.

He shows up to the new assignment, which has usually had several years of RDT&E on it already, and the outgoing OIC will brief him on what they’ve been doing, why, and what the current program schedule is. His duties and responsibilities related to budget, signature authority over inventory and personnel, and other administrative issues will be laid out, and the ball will be handed to him.

He will spend the next 6-12 months just trying to get a handle on the program while the subordinates continue on with what they were doing. There is often travel to industry conferences like AUSA, SOFEX, and SHOT Show where they will meet with vendors looking to find existing capabilities that can be tweaked to meet the program requirements.

Testing and soldier feedback studies will be conducted and documented following extensive protocols that generations of prior program managers from other commands have outlined and added upon. A primary driving force for the OIC will be to get his Officer Evaluation Report bullets rated favorably by his rater, who is overseeing multiple programs with other systems and subordinate officers managing their respective projects. 18-23 months flies by fast, terminal leave comes along with all kinds of use/lose days he’s accumulated chasing paper, and then he’s gone.

One of the things I’ve seen from these types of officers is that in place of comprehensive understanding of a system or concept, they will latch onto one aspect of the program that stood out to them when they tried to wrap their head around it. Given a total lack of relevant background, whatever they latch onto will be a distraction and deviant focal point from the core program intent. This often rises from problems that have been identified by the prior testing, in an area that needs to be fixed or improved because of an arbitrary or marginal need, but not really a game-changer. That’s how you end up with M-14s after WWII, forward assist on the M16A1 (1967), elevation wheels on M16A2 rear sights with heavy fore end barrel profiles and 3-round burst (1982), alternate magazine feed capability for the SAW, top handguards for the M240, and modular handguns.

In contrast, “the DoD entity” takes highly-experienced NCOs, Warrant Officers, and officers with extensive technical and operational backgrounds in skill sets they love and are good at, gives them pretty wide left and right limits with a generous budget, and tells them to take the ball and run as fast and far as they can with it to provide actual practical solutions for their organization. Often times, they are chasing capabilities they recognized and outlined themselves from doing the job personally for the past 10-18 years.

That’s how you get sections of Weaver rail bolted onto free-float handguards, which evolved into KAC rails and the MRE, Schmidt & Bender Short Dot LPVOs that changed the game for magnified optics on carbines, .260 Rem SR-25s, and now 6mm ARC DM rifles.

Meanwhile big Army thinks a steel upper receiver Hk 7.62 NATO rifle is a DMR, while working on a .270 Weatherby Magnum performance wunderwaffen, and Joe is still humping a 17lb SAW in 5.56 NATO that uses a Kalashnikov operating system. But we have SIG 9mm handguns that don’t make a hill of beans difference in the big picture compared to the M9. Success!

It all comes down to being terrible at identifying and managing talent. There is this odd fixation with moving people around to get as many different assignments as possible, rather than making them really good in a few areas of expertise.
That was about as perfectly-described as one can describe it!

Sirhr
 
Blame Robert McNamara. He was the former logistics officer who introduced the Ford Motor Company system that effectively eliminated the competent, experienced, specialist military officer throughout the DOD.
That particular initiative has probably killed far more US soldiers, sailors and airforce types than his decision to send undeveloped Armalite rifles to the troops in Vietnam; without instruction manuals, cleaning kits and the appropriate Ordnance personnel who would normally have been detached to assist with field trials of brand new weapons and ammunition.
The problem existed long before McNamara. He is to blame for a lot of things, but not ordnance’s core faults. He merely replaced the ossified generals with incapable civilians while the whole edifice needed reworking.

And in defense of the ordnance dept, they are somewhere below the catering corps in the level of DoD hierarchy, budgets and popularity. They may get some real best and brightest officers assigned. But even they may be just parking it there for a ticket punch or before checking out to civilian life with a defense contractor. In peacetime, no one cares about ordnance dept and their budget and congressional funding reflects it. in wartime no one wants to change weapons systems while there is a war on.

it’s a bureaucracy thing. Has been since the 1830s.

Sirhr
 
The problem existed long before McNamara. He is to blame for a lot of things, but not ordnance’s core faults. He merely replaced the ossified generals with incapable civilians while the whole edifice needed reworking.

And in defense of the ordnance dept, they are somewhere below the catering corps in the level of DoD hierarchy, budgets and popularity. They may get some real best and brightest officers assigned. But even they may be just parking it there for a ticket punch or before checking out to civilian life with a defense contractor. In peacetime, no one cares about ordnance dept and their budget and congressional funding reflects it. in wartime no one wants to change weapons systems while there is a war on.

it’s a bureaucracy thing. Has been since the 1830s.

Sirhr
And I need to add an amendment to this... which is to say that the Ordnance Board/Ordnance Dept/Ordnance Bureau... whatever it has been called in its many iterations, has not dropped the ball as badly as everyone would like to think.

In 1860, the Springfield and Harpers Ferry Arsenals were geared up to produce millions of highly-accurate rifled muskets, so effective, that they were years ahead of the tactics of the day. And they had the ability and planning capability to marshall and procure resources to make them.

The '03 Springfield and the 30-06 round are both still relevant today and were ready for WW1 in huge numbers... and still in service in Korea as sniper rifles.

By WW2, they were ready with the Garand, the greatest battle implement ever created (according to Patton... maybe I am wrong on that one).

The M16, despite its rush to production and teething has lasted for 55 years and is still modular enough to keep going on for a long time.

And they have avoided all manner of fads... that have not ended well for some other nations (or been stillborn). Bullpups. Caseless ammo. Electronic ignition.

So in some ways, inertia has worked well simply in that the department hasn't spent all its time chasing rainbows and squirrels while following the latest 'cool thing' they read about in Guns and Ammo.

We'll always complain about issued equipment, especially weapons. But when it comes to things that safe and take lives, "Proven" does have a value all its own.

Again, not saying there isn't a whole lot of fat or inertia or bad decision-making in big organizations. But I will throw out there that at least the Ordnance Departments have got it right quite a few times.

Cheers,

Sirhr
 
And I need to add an amendment to this... which is to say that the Ordnance Board/Ordnance Dept/Ordnance Bureau... whatever it has been called in its many iterations, has not dropped the ball as badly as everyone would like to think.

In 1860, the Springfield and Harpers Ferry Arsenals were geared up to produce millions of highly-accurate rifled muskets, so effective, that they were years ahead of the tactics of the day. And they had the ability and planning capability to marshall and procure resources to make them.

The '03 Springfield and the 30-06 round are both still relevant today and were ready for WW1 in huge numbers... and still in service in Korea as sniper rifles.

By WW2, they were ready with the Garand, the greatest battle implement ever created (according to Patton... maybe I am wrong on that one).

The M16, despite its rush to production and teething has lasted for 55 years and is still modular enough to keep going on for a long time.

And they have avoided all manner of fads... that have not ended well for some other nations (or been stillborn). Bullpups. Caseless ammo. Electronic ignition.

So in some ways, inertia has worked well simply in that the department hasn't spent all its time chasing rainbows and squirrels while following the latest 'cool thing' they read about in Guns and Ammo.

We'll always complain about issued equipment, especially weapons. But when it comes to things that safe and take lives, "Proven" does have a value all its own.

Again, not saying there isn't a whole lot of fat or inertia or bad decision-making in big organizations. But I will throw out there that at least the Ordnance Departments have got it right quite a few times.

Cheers,

Sirhr
One might argue that point about avoiding fads aka the M9 but that is just an opinion.

On a side note, I heard you like to play with cannons?
 
And I need to add an amendment to this... which is to say that the Ordnance Board/Ordnance Dept/Ordnance Bureau... whatever it has been called in its many iterations, has not dropped the ball as badly as everyone would like to think.

In 1860, the Springfield and Harpers Ferry Arsenals were geared up to produce millions of highly-accurate rifled muskets, so effective, that they were years ahead of the tactics of the day. And they had the ability and planning capability to marshall and procure resources to make them.

The '03 Springfield and the 30-06 round are both still relevant today and were ready for WW1 in huge numbers... and still in service in Korea as sniper rifles.

By WW2, they were ready with the Garand, the greatest battle implement ever created (according to Patton... maybe I am wrong on that one).

The M16, despite its rush to production and teething has lasted for 55 years and is still modular enough to keep going on for a long time.

And they have avoided all manner of fads... that have not ended well for some other nations (or been stillborn). Bullpups. Caseless ammo. Electronic ignition.

So in some ways, inertia has worked well simply in that the department hasn't spent all its time chasing rainbows and squirrels while following the latest 'cool thing' they read about in Guns and Ammo.

We'll always complain about issued equipment, especially weapons. But when it comes to things that safe and take lives, "Proven" does have a value all its own.

Again, not saying there isn't a whole lot of fat or inertia or bad decision-making in big organizations. But I will throw out there that at least the Ordnance Departments have got it right quite a few times.

Cheers,

Sirhr
I have to say, most of my issue is not with the BoO/Ballistics Board/etc. either with fumbling the ball. It was NOT the workers, or lower officers assigned to oversee projects. Those came out as intended. It's the people who deny all that RD&T, like MacArthur.

In the Civil War the Henry repeaters being denied because then Secretary of War Stanton declaring, "The men will just waste bullets with these."

The Spanish-American War which spawned the .30-06. The Krag 30-40 was shown to be a lesser platform than the Mauser. It wasn't so much the round as the platform. So, because of the 7x57 and it being able to capably hit and kill @ 2Km, we replaced it with the 30-06 that COULD NOT hit and kill at that distance. But it's not the Armory's fault. It was the civilian making the decision. They don't have, or won't believe, the whole chain of facts. They did what they were told, and that was to develop a .30 cal cartridge of greater power than the 7x57.
Added: I forgot, we put the 30-06 in a Mauser action...even had to pay Mauser for it.

Meanwhile, the 6mm Lee Navy got almost completely ignored. And, look what we shoot with today? 6mm has eclipsed everything a .30 magnum could do. Yet, those making decisions still think, "Big cartridge...more range." (Using their 'stupid' cave-man inner voice ...mhwuh???).

The M16? People still think it's not powerful enough. At engagement ranges it is. And, it's a lot lighter so you can carry a lot more 'kill beans'.
The modularity in itself means you can go back and forth with the basic platform for long-range or close-range effectivity. Night or day. The issue there is where do we stand? And, why would we have a bunch of uppers sitting in a warehouse that would be more effective in different battle terrain. Clearly that could be confusing and some unsuspecting young captain would mistakenly procure and issue those to troops going to the wrong AO for that upper. Maybe because they thought some dipshit sent mosquito nets to Alaska. Ever been there in the summer?

Closer and more adept assessment of the needs by people making top level decision is what is needed. We need more pushback from the bottom. Not the 'We told you so' from the unknowing top.

That is the pinpoint to me where this issue lies. Not enough power in the system from those who have been there and done that.
 
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Blame Robert McNamara. He was the former logistics officer who introduced the Ford Motor Company system that effectively eliminated the competent, experienced, specialist military officer throughout the DOD.
That particular initiative has probably killed far more US soldiers, sailors and airforce types than his decision to send undeveloped Armalite rifles to the troops in Vietnam; without instruction manuals, cleaning kits and the appropriate Ordnance personnel who would normally have been detached to assist with field trials of brand new weapons and ammunition.
There was a combination of that, but Army Ordnance had institutional problems dating back to the 1800s, like any organization.

Institutional inertia can be slow to adopt things like the repeating rifle or smokeless powder.

While McNamara got involved in the AR-15, there were justifiable acts of intervention after Army Ordnance was caught sabotaging the trials, where it still out-performed the M-14 even when rigged to fail.

The ordnance personnel were all still there in our US arsenals and ammunition-sourcing. That’s where the criminal negligence or sabotage with the substitution of ball powder for tiny extruded powder took place.

When the Colt 602 model production got turned-on, they certified the batch samples with the 8208M-type powder ammunition from the initial lot, then sent the rifles over with the newer WC ball powder lots. A lot of the rifles had chambers that didn’t meet spec, reamers run ragged as well.

There are a lot of places to legitimately hold accountable for the fiasco with 602 rifles, but this was all quickly rectified after the Ichord Hearings. Tighter spec adherence on reamers, chrome-lined chambers, and the heavy rifle buffer we all now know fixed those issues and made the rifle reliable with ball powder. Previous “buffer” was the Edgewater spring guide with very low mass to it.

Where McNamara, Kissinger, and LBJ really killed US servicemen was with the air campaign, notifying North Vietnamese of our intended targets, flight corridors, no-fly areas, off-limits targets, etc. That really prolonged the war that could have been ended by the USAF in a few weeks if they let the gloves come off. Watch one of the F-105 Thud pilot documentaries some time if you want your blood to boil.
 
There was a combination of that, but Army Ordnance had institutional problems dating back to the 1800s, like any organization.

Institutional inertia can be slow to adopt things like the repeating rifle or smokeless powder.

While McNamara got involved in the AR-15, there were justifiable acts of intervention after Army Ordnance was caught sabotaging the trials, where it still out-performed the M-14 even when rigged to fail.

The ordnance personnel were all still there in our US arsenals and ammunition-sourcing. That’s where the criminal negligence or sabotage with the substitution of ball powder for tiny extruded powder took place.

When the Colt 602 model production got turned-on, they certified the batch samples with the 8208M-type powder ammunition from the initial lot, then sent the rifles over with the newer WC ball powder lots. A lot of the rifles had chambers that didn’t meet spec, reamers run ragged as well.

There are a lot of places to legitimately hold accountable for the fiasco with 602 rifles, but this was all quickly rectified after the Ichord Hearings. Tighter spec adherence on reamers, chrome-lined chambers, and the heavy rifle buffer we all now know fixed those issues and made the rifle reliable with ball powder. Previous “buffer” was the Edgewater spring guide with very low mass to it.

Where McNamara, Kissinger, and LBJ really killed US servicemen was with the air campaign, notifying North Vietnamese of our intended targets, flight corridors, no-fly areas, off-limits targets, etc. That really prolonged the war that could have been ended by the USAF in a few weeks if they let the gloves come off. Watch one of the F-105 Thud pilot documentaries some time if you want your blood to boil.
Wait what? Notifying NVA of our targets? Wtf is up with that?
 
Wait what? Notifying NVA of our targets? Wtf is up with that?
In addition, Navy security was breached and so the NVA knew raid timetables, routes, etc. for huge numbers of raids. It was a turkey shoot and the U.S. Navy and USAF were the victims.

People should have gone to jail. But the leakers and the policy-wonks and others who inhibited the US efforts were woke and were basically communist sympathizers. Radicals who infiltrated the system. And they were so dreamy and courageous for opposing bad, bad war. And they never go to jail, now do they? Nope, they are now university professors and national security advisors...

But hindsight is 20/20. Winning all the battles and losing the war is caused by political weakness or by cancers inside the political system, not military (or DoD) incompetence. All the bad ball powder and comic-book cleaning manuals can't cure that.

Sirhr
 
Been looking at Steens. Really would like a 12 pounder.
Steens are very good. But they are poor at communication and deadlines. Plan accordingly.

I have a Tredegar Mtn. Rifle made by them as well as a Mountain Howitzer.

Cheers,

Sirhr

PS. Here is an original restored Armstrong from the Punjab.
ghost 3.jpg
 
In addition, Navy security was breached and so the NVA knew raid timetables, routes, etc. for huge numbers of raids. It was a turkey shoot and the U.S. Navy and USAF were the victims.

People should have gone to jail. But the leakers and the policy-wonks and others who inhibited the US efforts were woke and were basically communist sympathizers. Radicals who infiltrated the system. And they were so dreamy and courageous for opposing bad, bad war. And they never go to jail, now do they? Nope, they are now university professors and national security advisors...

But hindsight is 20/20. Winning all the battles and losing the war is caused by political weakness or by cancers inside the political system, not military (or DoD) incompetence. All the bad ball powder and comic-book cleaning manuals can't cure that.

Sirhr

And now we’re 2 generations further down the road with these commies and look where we’re at in 2021. A Chinese virus used as the excuse to enable a stolen election, Communist brown shirts that call themselves ANTIFA while intimidating the opposition, a complicit media, and an education system turning out indoctrinated socialist teachers and students that will never understand the greatness they are going to piss away. That DOD entity might get a chance to use that 6mm ARC DMR in a very target rich environment sooner rather than later. I only hope they bring enough for me to use because I can’t find it in stock anywhere!

Ahem, sorry just interesting how history keeps on rolling and building and repeating itself.

@LRRPF52, all that sounds frustrating.
 
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Steens are very good. But they are poor at communication and deadlines. Plan accordingly.

I have a Tredegar Mtn. Rifle made by them as well as a Mountain Howitzer.

Cheers,

Sirhr

PS. Here is an original restored Armstrong from the Punjab.
View attachment 7522631
I also looked at Hern Iron Works and Grey-Star Cannons. Any suggestions/recommendations on looking for a BP cannon?
 
@LRRPF52 were the 4x carry handle scopes ever used on the M16A1's/A2's?
Yes, in limited numbers, even up through 2002 at least.

We had some leftovers in the Arms Rooms in 3-325 AIR in 82nd. C Co’s Mortar Platoon Sergeant tried mounting and zeroing one on his M4 with the detachable carrying handle, and it wouldn’t hold zero.
 
@LRRPF52 were the 4x carry handle scopes ever used on the M16A1's/A2's?
I do not know which one's you are referring to, but we had a carry handle mounted scope. They were about the same quality of Tasco's cheapest of cheap. They were a "Broad daylight" scope only. That was circa '81-'85. To my knowledge, non of them went to Grenada. I don't know about later conflicts.
 
I also looked at Hern Iron Works and Grey-Star Cannons. Any suggestions/recommendations on looking for a BP cannon?

Subscribe to The Artilleryman Magazine. Check the classifieds and the ads. A lot of stuff comes up.


Also, believe it or not, a lot of good stuff comes up on Gunbroker. Not that I would suggest this as a first piece... but I have seen it and it is nice. You can probably get it for 1/4 that ;-)


The other thing is to go to the annual shoots. Or to reenactments. There is a big one each year in the Shenandoah around the time of the Battle of Lost Shoes. A lot of vendors show up and occasionally, you will find private 'regiments' or reenactors selling their cannons. No license required for BP cannons. Cash and carry. Boom! Fun!

Cheers,

Sirhr
 
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In addition, Navy security was breached and so the NVA knew raid timetables, routes, etc. for huge numbers of raids. It was a turkey shoot and the U.S. Navy and USAF were the victims.

People should have gone to jail. But the leakers and the policy-wonks and others who inhibited the US efforts were woke and were basically communist sympathizers. Radicals who infiltrated the system. And they were so dreamy and courageous for opposing bad, bad war. And they never go to jail, now do they? Nope, they are now university professors and national security advisors...

But hindsight is 20/20. Winning all the battles and losing the war is caused by political weakness or by cancers inside the political system, not military (or DoD) incompetence. All the bad ball powder and comic-book cleaning manuals can't cure that.

Sirhr
We had our own version of communist sabotage in NZ. An ammotech had the idea of using the .220 Swift to take out terrorists. A now deceased friend of mine built the rifles, including the prototype which worked very nicely at Trentham Camp, presumably on Somerville Range. They placed a training target showing a terrorist with hostage behind an aircraft window and put a pig’s head behind the terrorist’s head. High quality sniper rifle, Norma ammo and a perfect demo. A full set of rifles was made for NZSAS by possibly the finest gunsmith then practising in NZ.
What happened after that? We had a Labour government, with Cabinet members who sympathised with hostage-taking terrorist scum and did not like the idea that they could be taken out so easily. Cabinet ordered that the rifles be melted down at Glenbrook Steel Mill. Three decades back and those of us who remember the circumstances are still pi**ed off.
 
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There was a combination of that, but Army Ordnance had institutional problems dating back to the 1800s, like any organization.

Institutional inertia can be slow to adopt things like the repeating rifle or smokeless powder.

While McNamara got involved in the AR-15, there were justifiable acts of intervention after Army Ordnance was caught sabotaging the trials, where it still out-performed the M-14 even when rigged to fail.

The ordnance personnel were all still there in our US arsenals and ammunition-sourcing. That’s where the criminal negligence or sabotage with the substitution of ball powder for tiny extruded powder took place.

When the Colt 602 model production got turned-on, they certified the batch samples with the 8208M-type powder ammunition from the initial lot, then sent the rifles over with the newer WC ball powder lots. A lot of the rifles had chambers that didn’t meet spec, reamers run ragged as well.

There are a lot of places to legitimately hold accountable for the fiasco with 602 rifles, but this was all quickly rectified after the Ichord Hearings. Tighter spec adherence on reamers, chrome-lined chambers, and the heavy rifle buffer we all now know fixed those issues and made the rifle reliable with ball powder. Previous “buffer” was the Edgewater spring guide with very low mass to it.

Where McNamara, Kissinger, and LBJ really killed US servicemen was with the air campaign, notifying North Vietnamese of our intended targets, flight corridors, no-fly areas, off-limits targets, etc. That really prolonged the war that could have been ended by the USAF in a few weeks if they let the gloves come off. Watch one of the F-105 Thud pilot documentaries some time if you want your blood to boil.
Fair enough. I have a copy of the later version of Black Rifle. You forgot to mention the receiver corrosion.
 
Subscribe to The Artilleryman Magazine. Check the classifieds and the ads. A lot of stuff comes up.


Also, believe it or not, a lot of good stuff comes up on Gunbroker. Not that I would suggest this as a first piece... but I have seen it and it is nice. You can probably get it for 1/4 that ;-)


The other thing is to go to the annual shoots. Or to reenactments. There is a big one each year in the Shenandoah around the time of the Battle of Lost Shoes. A lot of vendors show up and occasionally, you will find private 'regiments' or reenactors selling their cannons. No license required for BP cannons. Cash and carry. Boom! Fun!

Cheers,

Sirhr
Thank you, it is a little challenging to find good information.

Very Respectfully
 
That sounds all really interesting. I think I should count the voices for every rifle model... ;)
To find the"winner"model... . :sneaky:

Merry Christmas to all of you !
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Winchester M70 Van Orden
I love the M96 and and variants. I recently lucked onto a CG63 and CG80 for sale at the same time by the same chap who had imported many Swede rifles into New Zealand over the years and I had bought FSR rifles off of him in the past. I got the pair for $1K USD and was a very happy Swede collector. I believe the m/41B to be the best sniper rifle ever made from a standard service rifle. It did see service with the Finns against the Soviets in the Continuation War as small numbers were gifted to Finland by Sweden. There is a famous photo that I'm sure you all would have seen that is supposed to depict Sïmo Häyhä in full snow camouflage and he has an m/41B in his hands. It is clearly a staged propaganda shot and may not have even been the great man himself (he has a face mask on) let alone knowing that he used an open sighted Nagant variant throughout. I agree that the Swede lineage is pretty formidable and for interest there is a little known variant of the CG63 called the CG637 which was built for the Singaporean Police with a total of less than 500 ever made in 7.62 NATO. I'm in the process of building a replica except Australian gun laws don't allow you to build rifles unless you are a certified gunsmith and none of the gunsmiths here want to do a 7.62 conversion because of the supposed 'weakness' of the actions and potential liability which is a shame because I literally have every component for the build except I have a Nagant scope mount instead of the specialised one in the pics.View attachment 7511914View attachment 7511915View attachment 7511916
Very good pictures !
A quite rare Sniper rifle, I got them impression.
 
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I have a soft spot for the Ross Rifle. The idea of a man to turn every Canadian Soldier into a Designated Marksman. His idea was for Canadian Soldiers to be more of an Elite unit that would fire one or two rounds and score a hit instead of massive volleys of dozens of rounds per person that the British were so fond of.

The Ross rifle got a really bad rap due to a few issues that weren't really that bad. The first issue was the rifle itself. It was built to such high tolerances for a military rifle at the time that it did not like to get dirty. Hard to keep a rifle clean in the trenches. The other issue was the ammo. Once again, the rifle was built to such tight tolerances that it needed the special Canadian made ammunition. This ammo became scarce meaning Canadians were forced to use the British produced 303 ammo. Their ammo wasn't to the same tolerances as Canadian manufacture and it caused jamming issues with the Ross. Last was the first gen bolt problem. If you didn't pay attention and installed the bolt head backwards, the gun would chamber and fire but the bolt wouldn't be locked and thus throw the bolt back into your face. I doubt this problem happened as much as urban legend says it says but so many people fear the Ross rifle for this reason even through Ross fixed the first gen bolts and made sure the next gen didn't have the same problem.
 
I have a soft spot for the Ross Rifle. The idea of a man to turn every Canadian Soldier into a Designated Marksman. His idea was for Canadian Soldiers to be more of an Elite unit that would fire one or two rounds and score a hit instead of massive volleys of dozens of rounds per person that the British were so fond of.

The Ross rifle got a really bad rap due to a few issues that weren't really that bad. The first issue was the rifle itself. It was built to such high tolerances for a military rifle at the time that it did not like to get dirty. Hard to keep a rifle clean in the trenches. The other issue was the ammo. Once again, the rifle was built to such tight tolerances that it needed the special Canadian made ammunition. This ammo became scarce meaning Canadians were forced to use the British produced 303 ammo. Their ammo wasn't to the same tolerances as Canadian manufacture and it caused jamming issues with the Ross. Last was the first gen bolt problem. If you didn't pay attention and installed the bolt head backwards, the gun would chamber and fire but the bolt wouldn't be locked and thus throw the bolt back into your face. I doubt this problem happened as much as urban legend says it says but so many people fear the Ross rifle for this reason even through Ross fixed the first gen bolts and made sure the next gen didn't have the same problem.
During WW2 the Russians issued self-loading rifles to their Naval regiments because sailors were accustomed to using and maintaining machinery and bolt actions to pretty much everyone else.
 
That sounds interesting... The Zfk55... May i ask the reason ?
Yes, the stock is already in a shorter configuration. The muzzle brake like like a copy of the FG42 and the rifle feels like a 22 when you shoot it due to the brake design. The 4X scope is crystal clear and it's easy to shoot 1 moa out to 300 yards with quality match ammo. Then there's the wonderful Swiss workmanship. I owned 2 of them before I had to sell off my collection as I became a septuagenarian. Didn't want to have to leave my collection for my wife to sell off. I owned most of the sniper rifles mentioned but the K31/ZFK and the M41B were my 2 favorites.
 
Just read that Garand originally designed his famous rifle in that 276 Pedersen (7mm) cartridge with DETACHABLE mags!?
That is not quite correct. The best book on the history of the M1 Garand is Bruce Canfield's huge 872 page book, The M1 Garand Rifle (2013).
In this book you will see basically all of the prototype semi-automatic rifles that John Garand developed starting in the early 1920s until 1936 when the M1 Garand in 30 caliber was standardized. None had detachable magazines to the best of my knowledge, but the .276 Pedersen round was designed to be used in a 10-round enbloc clip - going back to his original patent from the mid-1920s (see 1st and 2nd pics). When the 30 caliber was selected, he modified the enbloc accordingly which held 8 cartridges, but I can't find references to any detachable prototype mags for the M1 design back the late 1920s (or in the 1930s).

There were two rifles evaluated circa 1928 that did have 5 or 10 rd detachable magazines, but they were not related to John Garand's design.
(see 3rd pic for the two rifles with detachable mags that were evaluated - but lost to John Garand's design, as seen in Canfield's book, pgs 67-87)

- First was a Colt in .276 designed by Jonathan Browning (younger brother to the famous John Mosses Browning who had died in 1926).
- Second was a superb-looking Czech ZH-29 rifle designed by Vaclev Holek (of Bren gun fame). Only a few made, but it was innovative.

To the best of my knowledge, the first detachable magazine M1 that John Garand designed was in late 1944, when he was ordered to make some prototype select-fire M1s for the prospective invasion of Japan. This was the T20/T20E1 rifle that used BAR magazines, and he worked on these during the rest of WWII, but it was canceled in August or September 1945 after the Japanese surrendered. Here's T20 serial # 1, made Oct 1944: https://museum.nps.gov/ParkObjdet.aspx?rID=SPAR 2266&db=objects&dir=CR AAWEB&page=1

Ironically, John Garand retired from SA in 1953, but the Armory was having various nagging problems developing the T44 rifle (which became the M14) including an issue regarding reliability of the magazine. Garand went to work as a consultant to Springfield Armory, via the Matthewson Tool & Die company - and he fixed the issue with the feed lips on the M14 magazine during the 1953-54 timeframe - but that was well after WWII...Just an fyi.
 

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@Random Guy, interesting stuff. I don’t know if there was ever a prototype produced but my understanding is that Garand did want detachable magazines but the ordnance department wanted an internal clip or mag and stipulated such in the trials.

Per m-1Garand.com there were 10-20 round detachable mag versions at some point. I don’t know how well researched that site is.

It’s probably fair to say it was at least considered at the time, apparently the Ordnance guys thought an exterior mag would be lost easily and problematic for drilling, etc. That’s thinking ahead... don’t use a detachable mag because it will mess with how we make guys march and twirl their rifles, 🙄. Kind of like in The Civil War how repeating rifles were squashed for the Union army because they would “burn through too much ammo.”

Anyways, I still think as far as rifles that ALMOST happened a .276 mag fed Garand would have made a badass DMR/ battle rifle. With detachable mags mounting optics would have been much easier obviously.

We almost had a similar 6.5mm FAL I think 20 years later but we dicked over the rest of NATO on that one. Not sure what the accuracy potential of a FAL is, on average probably 2 moa?
 

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I don’t mind, but y’all might as well just start a *cannon thread here in vintage. That’s just what I need, another expensive hobby. 😉

*edited for spelling, don’t need a thread about scriptural canon, haha at least not here!
 
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Some of Garand's early stuff was pretty funky


Still a very intelligent man tho


I have wondered if .30 Remington with a 130-135 grain bullet at around 2500 fps would have worked with a 10-12 round en block out of a pot bellied Garand.

Keep 30-06 for the bar and machine guns, but use the .30 rem in the Garand and replace the m1 carbine.
 
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